In an experimental setting in Kenya, we show that certain financial and informational interventions delivered over the mobile phone network can be highly effective in boosting facility delivery rates of poor, rural women. Vouchers covering the full cost of care increased facility delivery rates by one-third, but a small copayment reduced the effect to almost zero. Cash transfers sent over the mobile network and labeled as transport subsidies, had similarly large effects only if they were conditional on delivering in a facility. By contrast, unconditional transfers had no effect on health care utilization. In contrast, we find a government policy that simply made care free at the point of service had little effect on demand.
Introduction
Despite recent progress, rates of infant and maternal mortality remain persistently high in the developing world, due in part to a lack of timely access to quality maternal health services. 1, 2 In this study we experimentally test policies to reduce the financial, transportation, and informational barriers to care faced by pregnant women in rural
Kenya. In particular, we assess the impacts of maternal health care vouchers, cash transfers labeled as transport subsidies, and SMS reminders on facility delivery rates.
As detailed below, we find that vouchers covering the full cost of care at public facilities had a sizeable impact on demand, while vouchers requiring a small out-ofpocket payment had virtually no impact. A conditional cash transfer paid to women who delivered in a clinic had a similar effect to that of the full voucher, but unconditional cash transfers paid in advance of attendance had no impact, suggesting incentives, not liquidity constraints, are critical barriers to the women in our sample. Finally, in general using SMS messages to remind women to deliver in clinics had little impact, although we find suggestive evidence that when those messages were made particularly salient and were received by an intermediary -not by the pregnant woman herself -they could be effective.
The demand-side vouchers we evaluate stand in apparent contrast to supply-side interventions, such as those deployed in Rwanda (Basinga et al. 2011) , Cambodia (Van de Poel et al. 2016) , and Burundi (Bonfrer, Van de Poel, and van Doorslaer 2014) . But while specific features and implementation details differ across supply and demand side incentives, to the extent that both approaches reduce the consumer price (sometimes to zero) while maintaining the producer price, the difference is largely administrative. We 1 Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 5, a target to reduce maternal mortality rates by three quarters globally between 1990-2015, was not met and the situation is particularly dire in Sub-Saharan Africa where more than half of all maternal deaths take place (Alkema et al. 2016; Kassebaum et al. 2014) . 2 Promoting the use of health services may do little to improve health outcomes unless quality levels are maintained or increased. In Tanzania, increased use of public health services led to improved health outcomes through more timely access to malaria diagnosis and better adherence to treatment (Adhvaryu and Nyshadham 2015) . A number of observational studies suggest that women who either give birth in a health care facility or in the presence of a skilled birth attendant have better pregnancy outcomes, as do their newborns Darmstadt et al. 2009; Scott and Ronsmans 2009 ). In the Netherlands, where rates of facility deliveries are much higher and rates of maternal and newborn deaths are much lower than in the developing world, one study has shown that newborns fare better when delivered in a health facility rather than at home (Trandafir and Daysal 2015) .
illustrate with a simple model that the equilibrium impacts on the quantity and quality of care provided are invariant to the means by which the subsidy is delivered. 3, 4 While vouchers are most typically conceived of as a means to exempt targeted users from prevailing fees, supply side incentives tend to be implemented in the context of care that is already free to the consumer. Unexpectedly, mid-way through our experiment, the government of Kenya instituted such a free-care policy, which, in light of the equivalence between supply and demand side subsidies, allowed us to compare the two approaches to reducing demand side financial barriers.
An alternative way to promote the use of health care services is through conditional or unconditional cash transfers (CCTs or UCTs). 5 While formally similar to a voucher-mediated price subsidy, CCTs might usefully focus consumers' attention on complementary goods and services. 6 A number of studies have investigated the impact of CCTs on health service utilization, nutrition and other health outcomes (Lagarde, Haines, and Palmer 2009) . Rigorous evidence from the impact of CCTs on maternal health outcomes has also been demonstrated Mexico (Barber and Gertler 2010) , Indonesia (Kusuma et al. 2016) , Nepal (Powell-Jackson and Hanson 2012), and India (Lim et al. 2010; Powell-Jackson, Mazumdar, and Mills 2015) .
On the other hand, if consumers have challenges planning ahead or face liquidity constraints, a labeled but otherwise unconditional transfer delivered at the appropriate time might increase the utilization of health services. To date, the evidence on the impact of UCTs is mixed, and there is limited evidence of their impact on health utilization. A UCT in Morocco, in which beneficiaries were provided money unconditionally but were informed that it was to be used to finance education expenses found that such a "nudge" 3 One form of supply side intervention is a so-called "performance-based financing" mechanism, in which payments to providers are tied to specific deliverables. 4 Ellis and McGuire (1993) addresses the trade-off between demand-side and supply-side cost sharing in the context of insured health care services in the US, an environment in which limiting demand and costs, while protecting consumers from risk, was a primary motivation (Ellis and McGuire 1993) . In our context, the interventions are motivated by a somewhat different concern -that of increasing demand for and utilization of health services, while maintaining quality. 5 Indeed a cash transfer conditional on visiting a health care facility should have equivalent effects to a price subsidy of the same magnitude (even if it was used in the context of otherwise "free" care, thereby making the net price negative), although cash-in-hand could be viewed differently to a subsidized price by consumers, again for either behavioral reasons or if they anticipate that payment of the conditional transfer will be delayed, perhaps indefinitely. 6 In our context, these include transport costs, which are believed to represent a significant barrier to maternal health care use in many low-income country settings (Sacks et al. 2015) .
was almost as effective as a conditional transfer at improving educational outcomes (Benhassine et al. 2015) . Similar results are observed for a subset of the health outcomes in the UCT arm of a trial in Malawi (Baird, McIntosh, and Özler 2011) . An evaluation of the short-term impact of a UCT program in Kenya supported by the NGO GiveDirectly found little short-term impact on any health measure (Haushofer and Shapiro 2016) .
While paper vouchers may be costly to administer and to target, 7 especially amongst poor and geographically remote populations, the reach of the mobile phone, and the explosion of mobile money in Kenya has provided a platform over which both targeted financial subsidies and information can be delivered at minimal cost (Suri and Jack 2016; Suri, Jack, and Stoker 2012; Jack and Suri 2014) . 8 Another potential advantage of using a mobile platform to deliver financial subsidies is that additional interventions can be deployed in tandem. For example, socalled 'mHealth' initiatives have targeted information to health care providers, or have sent SMS reminders to patients to maintain adherence to medicines or to increase the use of routine health services (Sondaal et al. 2016; Lester et al. 2010; Pop-Eleches et al. 2011; Raifman et al. 2014 ). How such messages can be designed to be most effective, for example in terms of their salience, has received less attention in the literature. We thus tested two types of SMS messages, as described below, both of which provided information on the importance of a healthy pregnancy and maternal health care.
However, one version of the messages was "plain", while the other was more "contextualized", modified to make the health of the baby more salient to the prospective mothers.
Our study makes a number of contributions to the literature on the design of health promotion programs in low-income settings. First, we find a strong effect of the full voucher and the CCT on facility deliveries, especially when they are delivered in combination. Forty-seven percent of women with access to both the CCT and the full voucher delivered in a clinic or hospital, while only 33 percent of those with neither did 7 See Schmidt et al. (2010) for a discussion (Schmidt et al. 2010) . From a tax-efficiency perspective, an advantage of vouchers is that they can be targeted to those whose behavior is expected to respond to a price subsidy, thereby limiting the fiscal cost. Of course, identifying the most needy and responsive individuals (often through some sort of proxy means test) is non-trivial (Jehu-Appiah et al. 2010) . 8 In Niger, the use of mobile phones to deliver a cash transfer program provided more benefits to households than resources transferred via more manual methods (Aker et al. 2016) so, a 14 percentage point, or 42 percent, increase in institutional delivery rates. Without a health care voucher, the CCT increased facility deliveries by 8.7 percentage points, while the full voucher alone increased facility deliveries by 11 percentage points.
Second, we find that the UCT had little impact, suggesting women were not simply liquidity constrained, and that in this context they did not respond to such a nudge.
Third, amongst women who did not receive a cash transfer, and whose only financial incentive at the margin to deliver in a clinic was a maternity care voucher, our evidence suggests the small copayment reduced demand to levels close to the control group. Specifically, our point estimate of the effect the copay voucher is one-tenth that of the full voucher, and is not statistically different from zero. On the other hand, we reject the null of equal average treatment effects of the full and copay voucher, but only at the ten percent level among non-recipients of a cash transfer. Our tentative conclusion, consistent with the findings from some other experimental studies of the demand for health commodities, that a small cost-sharing contribution for maternal health services has a large, if not discontinuous, impact on demand (Cohen and Dupas 2010; Ashraf, Berry, and Shapiro 2010; Kremer and Miguel 2007) .
Fourth, we find no evidence that either type of text message affected utilization of maternal care services across the full sample. However, there is suggestive evidence of an effect for women who received the contextualized messages via someone else's phone: although imprecisely estimated, such women appear to have higher rates of facility delivery than those who received the messages on their own phones. There was no response from either group to the simple reminders. We discuss the extent to which these results might reflect the importance of the face-to-face engagement of a third party (the owner of the phone) in inducing behavior change in this context.
Fifth, consistent with the model of quality we develop, we find little impact of the free care policy on demand for women without vouchers. On the other hand, even after the policy change, women with vouchers consistently had higher rates of facility delivery than women without vouchers. We find some evidence that the voucher holding women paid less for maternity care, even after the free maternity care policy was implemented.
In addition, we also investigate the perceived quality of care reported by women as a function of voucher status, and depending on whether their due dates fell before and after the policy change. Recognizing that quality is only observed for those who deliver at a facility, we use the randomly assigned conditional cash transfer to instrument for selection, which we find predicts demand, but we argue is unlikely to have induced a quality response from the facilities. Our results suggest that prior to the free care policy, voucher recipients perceived somewhat higher quality care in some dimensions, particularly those that could be varied on a patient-by-patient basis. During the new policy regime however, this quality differential appears to be eliminated, although it is difficult to tell if this convergence reflects real quality changes. More objective measures of quality show much less variation across treatment groups, or over time.
Section 2 describes the context and our interventions in more detail, section 3 develops a simple model of demand and supply with endogenous quality, section 4 describes our recruitment activities and the data sources used, section 5 outlines our empirical strategy, and section 6 presents our results. Section 7 explores the costeffectiveness of the interventions, adjusted for potentially distortionary financing costs, while section 8 concludes.
Context and Description of interventions
Kenya's maternal mortality ratio was estimated to be 362 per 100,000 live births during 2007-2014, only slightly lower than some estimates for 1990. There was no measurable decline in the rate during the early 2000s and rates may have even increased during the 1990s. 9 In the 2014 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey, only 61% of births in the preceding 5 years were reported to have taken place in a health facility (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and The DHS Program 2015). In Western
Province, 10 where this study was carried out, the corresponding figure was a little less than half (47%), although that was nearly double the rate reported in the 2008-9 DHS 9 Due to a lack of data from a vital statistics registry, maternal mortality rates in Kenya are modeled and thus estimates vary depending on the data source and models employed (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and ICF Macro 2010; Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and The DHS Program 2015; Lozano et al. 2011; Hogan et al. 2010) . 10 Under the current Kenyan Constitution, which was passed in 2010, new administrative structures were drawn up and the eight provinces were replaced by 47 counties. Vihiga County, the location of this study, was part of Western Province at the time of the 2008 DHS, and thus could not be directly identified in those survey data. In the 2014 DHS however, Vihiga County was identifiable.
(Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and ICF Macro 2010). In the earlier DHS survey, the most commonly cited reasons for not delivering in a health facility among women were geographic and financial barriers. While nearly all pregnant women in Kenya (96%) received some antenatal care (ANC) services, only a little more than half (58%) made the recommended four or more visits during their pregnancies, and they often sought care late -the median gestation at first visit was 5.4 months instead of the recommended 12 weeks. Finally, more than 60% of pregnant women in Western Province (43% nationally) did not receive any postnatal care (PNC) after their most recent live birth.
Our research project was conducted in collaboration with Changamka, a microhealth Insurance organization, whose "m-Kadi" program provided the platform over which the experimental interventions were delivered to pregnant women in Vihiga
County. Below we describe in more detail the three types of interventions: maternity health care vouchers, cash transfers labeled as transport subsidies, and reminder SMS messages. The three intervention types, which each included two treatments and a control, were crossed, yielding a 3x3x3 design.
(i) Maternal health care vouchers
Two types of maternal health vouchers that covered ANC visits, delivery, and PNC visits, were offered to selected women. The vouchers covered the costs of these services, as reported in Appendix Table 1 , plus a small premium to compensate facilities for the administrative burden of adopting the system and recording utilization.
Women assigned to the "full voucher" group made no payments to the facility, and in principle were not required to purchase any inputs or consumables at the point of service. As the majority of the health facilities in our catchment area only offered basic emergency obstetric care, if a woman in the full voucher group presented at a health clinic in labor, but required a cesarean section or additional obstetric procedures, she would be transported to the Vihiga District Hospital, the only health facility in the catchment area that provided comprehensive emergency obstetric services. Under this circumstance, the voucher program reimbursed both the health clinic and the hospital.
The cost of transport from the clinic to the hospital was also covered if the woman had a voucher, but women without a voucher had to pay for those services, as they would under normal circumstances.
A second group of women received a "copay voucher," under which they received free care for all ANC and PNC services, but were required to pay a 100 KSh (about $1.20 at the time) copayment for a facility delivery, which represented about 10 percent of the median reported price for a normal delivery paid by the control group.
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The copayment, which had to be made at the time of check-in via one of Kenya's mobile money platforms, was the same across facilities, and did not depend on whether a cesarean section was performed. The facility would not be reimbursed for deliveries of women in the copay voucher group unless the copayment had been made.
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(ii) Cash transfers to subsidize transport costs
We administered two types of cash transfers -conditional and unconditionaldesigned to help overcome transport cost barriers. These subsidies, also delivered by mobile phone, were not tied directly to the purchase of transport services, primarily because of the challenges of keeping track of receipts and limiting fraud. Instead, those women assigned to the conditional cash transfer arm were sent transfers if and when they presented at a health facility for one of the prescribed maternal health services, and if their visit was recorded in the online accounting system. This conditional transfer was paid for up to four ANC visits, a facility delivery, and up to three PNC visits. An eligible woman received a transfer of 250 KSh (about $3 USD) for each eligible ANC and PNC visit, and a 500 KSh ($6 USD) transfer for her delivery.
Another group of women were randomized into an unconditional cash transfer arm. Transfers in the same amounts as the conditional arm were remitted to these women on the mobile money platform a few days before each of their predicted ANC and PNC visits, according to the schedule recommended by the Kenyan Ministry of Health, and a week before her expected delivery date.
11 Even after the free care policy came into effect, if the facility was to be reimbursed for serving copay voucher recipients, the 100 KSh payment had to be made. It is possible that the facility itself could have executed this payment on behalf of the woman, in order to earn the face value of the voucher, if the woman was unwilling to do so. 12 Our data, which includes the mobile phone number from which payments were made, indicates that the practice of the facility remitting the co-payment in order to qualify for the larger reimbursement was not prevalent.
We reiterate that the cash transfers were not formally linked to the purchase of transport services. However, because we told women that they were meant to help with transport costs, and they were large enough to cover reasonable fares, there could have been a labeling effect associated with these two arms. Appendix Table 2 provides a comparison of the plain reminder messages and those that were contextualized to strengthen the incentive to use the service. Both types of messages were sent on the same schedule, and assignment of the SMS treatments was orthogonal to that of the financial interventions.
A model of price and quality
Let us focus on a normal delivery as the unit of care. Let the regulated price of a delivery be p, which without further government intervention is the amount paid by the customer and received by the clinic. The government, or other sponsor, can also provide a subsidy s per delivery to the consumer, for example through a voucher. When the voucher is redeemed in exchange for services, the clinic receives a payment s from the Consider a consumer who chooses between health services h and another composite numeraire good x. The quality of health services is q, which she takes as exogenously fixed. We assume quality is not contractible, so the price and subsidy do not depend on it, although consumer preferences are sensitive to it. Suppressing the dependence on income, health status, and other factors, consumer demand is a function of the net-of-subsidy price, and quality, ℎ ' ! − #; ) , which is assumed to be decreasing in the first argument, and increasing in the second.
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On the supply side, clinics maximize an objective function that responds directly to the quantity and/or quality of services provided (so there is thus some incentive to provide at least a minimal level of service), but is also sensitive to retained revenues and costs. Holding quality fixed, the supply of services is ℎ * ! + %; ) , which is assumed to be increasing in the first argument, and decreasing in the second.
15 If p -s is negative, demand is ℎ ' 0; ) .
If the price p is regulated at a fixed level, then equality of demand and supply is attained by quality adjustment, with an equilibrium quantity of services ℎ * (! − #, ! + %), provided at quality ) * (! − #, ! + %). A number of policy scenarios can be considered using this simple model. First, prior to our intervention, a fixed price for services prevailed, with no additional consumer subsidy or supply side payment in place. That # = % = 0, and the equilibrium quantity of services was ℎ * (!, !), at quality ) * (!, !), as illustrated in With no subsidies, equilibrium quantity and quality 1 * (2, 2) and 3 * (2, 2) respectively. Introducing a demand side voucher with face value equal to the regulated price leads to an increase in quantity to 1 * 4, 2 but a fall in quality to 3 * 4, 2 . Under a free care policy, quality falls to 3 * (4, 4) and the quantity, 1 * (4, 4), could be largely unaffected compared with the regulated positive price outcome.
Introducing the voucher with a face-value of p in this context increases the quantity demanded at any given quality, shifting the h D curve to the right, as shown in Figure 2 . The number of services provided increases accordingly to ℎ * 0, ! > ℎ * (!, !), but quality falls to ) * 0, ! < ) * (!, !) to equilibrate the market.
On the other hand, a "free care" policy that reduces the regulated price to zero without any consumer or producer payments results primarily in a potentially large fall in quality. To see this, note that a free care policy shifts the demand function in the same way as a full voucher, to ℎ ' (0, )), but it also shifts the supply function to ℎ * (0, )), as shown in Figure 2 . The quantity of services delivered falls compared with the voucher scenario, to ℎ * (0,0), and could end up close to the level under the regulated (positive) price outcome. Quality is ) * (0,0).
Combining the free care policy with a voucher has precisely the same impact as free care plus a supply side subsidy of % = #. In particular, the supply curve shifts back out to ℎ * (#, )), and if the subsidy is equal to the original regulated price, Figure 2 again prevails and the quantity and quality of services is the same as with a voucher in the context of fee-for-service care.
The model suggests that introducing a voucher with a face value s at or below the prevailing regulated price acts as a demand side subsidy, but that as s increases above p (which might be zero), the voucher is equivalent to a supply side payment. By administering the voucher program after the price of maternity services was reduced to zero, we effectively implemented a supply side subsidy, whose effects are expected to be similar to those of a voucher of the same value that reduces the consumer price to zero.
The conditional cash transfer might be expected to have similar effects to a voucher of the same face value. There are two differences however: first, even if the regulated price of care is zero, the consumer still benefits directly from the CCT, effectively facing a negative price; and second, again when the regulated price is low or zero, the provider does not benefit from the CCT, while it does with the voucher. The result, in the context of free-care, is illustrated in Figure 3 . Finally, absent behavioral effects associated with labeling, the unconditional cash transfer is likely to have a (small) income effect on demand, and little effect on supply. Assuming providers can at least partially differentiate among women based on their individual demands, our model suggests demand will be higher but quality lower under the full voucher and CCT compared with prevailing levels under a fee for service regime, and that demand could be largely unaffected, but quality again lower, under the free care policy.
Although these theoretical predictions are straightforward, we face both econometric and simple measurement challenges in observing them in the data. Below we propose an identification strategy to address the econometric issue of selection, but measuring quality in a reliable way remains problematic (Akachi and Kruk 2017) .
Nonetheless, even if quality impacts turn out to be difficult to detect, the differential effects on the quantity of services provided under different regimes can be rationalized by appealing to an underlying quality adjustment mechanism.
Recruitment and data collection
Community Health Workers (CHWs), whose regular job includes identifying, monitoring, and counseling pregnant women in their home villages, were trained and engaged by our research team in collaboration with Changamka to implement the recruitment activities for this project. Village meetings were conducted in which women and other community members were informed about the new "m-Kadi" program.
Women were told that by enrolling in the program they could receive financial support to help them cover the costs of their pregnancy, although they were not told which benefits, if any, they might receive. After the meetings, the CHWs approached pregnant women in their villages to see if they were interested in enrolling in the program. Women were informed of the potential benefits of the program and were asked to give informed consent to participate in the study. Between February and July 2013, a total of 1,595 eligible pregnant women consented and were enrolled into the program.
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At recruitment, CHWs administered a face-to-face survey collecting data on demographics, current pregnancy status, prior pregnancies, and other information using a mobile phone for data collection. Participating women were given a unique ID number, which they were told to present at health facilities for all maternal health visits.
Of the 1,595 women recruited, only 1,514 were eligible for our endline survey: 2 women turned out not to be pregnant, 7 died during the course of the study, and 72 experienced a miscarriage. 17 Panel A of Table 1 reports the numbers of women in our endline eligible sample assigned to each combination of health care voucher and cash transfer treatments, while Panel B reports the distribution of our sample that actually completed the endline survey. The Panel C Table 1 reports the assignment to SMS treatments, which was orthogonal to the other two treatment assignments. A full description of the attrition in our sample is also available in Appendix Table 3 . Table 2 reports balance tests using baseline data for the maternal health care vouchers (Panel A) and cash transfer arms (Panel B). 18 The treatment and control groups for all of the interventions were well balanced.
Although cash transfers and copayments were made over the mobile money platform, and text messages were administered, women were not required to possess a mobile phone to take part in the study. Instead, they could specify the number of phone that would be used for these purposes, often belonging to a family member, friend, or sometimes the community health worker herself.
16 Eligibility for the m-Kadi program was restricted to poor women without a formal occupation. 17 We acknowledge that the second and third outcomes could have been affected by the treatments themselves, but we lack power to speak definitively to this possibility. 18 We do no present the balance test for the SMS subsidies, but they are available upon request.
When a woman visited one of the eight participating health facilities, 19 her program ID number was recorded, and basic information collected in an on-line database, which was linked to the payment system through which vouchers were redeemed by the facility. Data clerks at the facilities were in charge of these operations, and worked in shifts to provide 24-hour coverage. However, as we report below compliance with the data collection protocol at the facilities was imperfect, particularly, and not surprisingly, for women who did not receive a maternity care voucher or conditional cash transfer.
However, as part of routine administrative procedures at public facilities, nurses and other staff recorded information on all patients visiting a facility in register books at all of the participating facilities. As we describe below, we use both the survey data (from baseline and endline) and register book data in our analysis.
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The endline survey was administered in person by the CHWs on a rolling basis in four phases between August 2013 and March 2014 to women whose expected delivery date (as estimated at recruitment) had recently passed. We attempted to reach women who could not be interviewed in person with follow-up phone surveys. 21 Data on the number and timing of ANC visits, when and where their delivery took place, the number of PNC visits she made, and measures of her perceived quality of care were all collected in the endline survey.
We face two potential biases in using the endline survey data to measure pregnancy outcomes: first, measurement error issues could arise if women gave false answers, either simply due to recall bias or strategically if they felt they should answer in a particular way; and second, if we find that there was significant non-random attrition from the baseline sample, especially by women who could not be found or did not give consent to be interviewed. Table 3 reports the correlation of attrition at endline with assignment to the voucher and cash transfer arms, and their interactions. Of the 1,514 women who were eligible to take the endline survey, 1,401 (92.5%) completed either the in-person endline survey or the phone survey: we were unable to find 43 of the non-respondents (2.8% of the eligible sample), while 70 women (4.6% of the eligible sample) refused to consent to the survey. Column (2) shows that other than a small negative effect of being assigned to the conditional cash transfer there was no correlation between being found at endline and any of the other treatment assignments, while Column (3) confirms that assignment to either a health care voucher or cash transfer treatment arm, or their interactions, reduced consent-related attrition.
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To account for possible measurement error, and also to correct for non-random attrition, we constructed a complementary dataset on the place of delivery, using data from the register books from all eight health facilities in our catchment area. As described in more detail in footnote 26, we construct two new indicators of place of delivery that differ according to the strength of the match between our baseline survey data and the register book data. 23 According to these definitions, between 590 and 772 of the 1,514 women eligible to take the endline survey were recorded as having delivered in a health care facility. Using this approach, the rate of facility deliveries in the control group ranged between 33 and 46%, which is more consistent with estimates we would have expected based on data from the 2014 Kenyan DHS (which was 47% in the preceding 5 years).
22 Attrition was uncorrelated with assignment to the SMS treatment arms and whether or not women in the initial sample were eligible for the endline survey (results not shown). 23 Matching register data to our baseline and endline datasets was non-trivial since, for example, women's names are often spelled differently in the register book and dates are remembered or recorded with error.
To develop the database, we first took photographs of the pages in the register books kept in the labor and delivery units of each facility over the entire study period. These books were then transcribed into a database by two independent transcribers, if the transcriptions were not exact, then the transcripts were manually reconciled by a third person. We then developed an automated matching algorithm to find the closest match for each woman in our baseline survey to entries in the transcribed database. Match scores were based on her expected date of delivery, the age of the woman, her first and last name, and her home village. Two research assistants working independently were then asked to determine if there was a match among the closest matches obtained from the matching algorithm. If both research assistants agreed on the same match for the woman in our baseline survey, then we recorded that birth as having taken place in a health facility. Otherwise the woman was assumed to have delivered outside of a health facility. We refer to this as the "full match" algorithm. We also include results for a "partial match" definition of facility delivery, equal to 1 if either one or both manual checks indicate such. By this latter measure, there were 772 facility births. The number of self-reported facility deliveries, 1,189, was much larger. Although the routinely collected facility level data could be incomplete, there is no reason to believe it is biased with respect to the research design. For this reason, while we present the results from both the endline survey and the register book dataset, our preferred specification is based on the full match data from the register books.
However, as we were only able to generate a comparable dataset for delivery outcomes (but not for ANC or PNC visits), we used the endline survey data for other health care utilization outcomes.
Empirical strategy (i) Maternal health care utilization
Our primary outcome variable of interest, 8 9 is in-facility or institutional delivery, but we also estimate treatment effects on hospital deliveries, referrals to hospitals, as well as the number of ANC and PNC visits. Our main results focus on the coefficients in unsaturated regressions of the form: where:
• = 9 @ = 1 if individual i is assigned to the full voucher group and zero otherwise;
• = 9 > = 1 if she is assigned to the copay voucher group and zero otherwise;
• C 9 @ = 1 if she is assigned to the conditional cash transfer group and zero otherwise;
• C 9 > = 1 if she is assigned to the unconditional cash transfer group and zero otherwise;
• F 9 @ = 1 if individual i is assigned to the contextual SMS group and zero otherwise; and
• F 9 > = 1 if she is assigned to the plain SMS group and zero otherwise. We estimate the impact of the free-care policy including potentially differential effects of the experimental treatments before and after the policy, by running an additive as well as a fully interacted model of the specifications above with an indicator equal to 1 if the expected delivery date is after the policy change. 25 We conduct a Chow test to determine the likelihood that the process determining facility delivery is the same before and after the free care policy.
(
ii) Quality
To assess the possible quality impacts of the experimental interventions and the free care policy, we use the quality data that we collected in the endline survey, which we have for all women who reported having delivered in a health facility. A simple treatment-control comparison presents us with the obvious selection issue however, that quality is only observed for those who attend a facility, and attendance rates differ by treatment assignment. For example, women who respond to the vouchers might be relatively poor, relatively healthy (in terms of their need for health care), or different in other unobserved ways. In turn, reported quality could respond in various ways to these underlying characteristics, say because health care workers treat poor people badly, because healthier women don't need such high quality, or because the perceptions of what constitutes "good" quality are different for the marginal client.
To address this problem, we exploit the orthogonal cash transfer arms of our experiment using a Heckman selection model (Heckman 1976 
Results
We first report the effects of our experimental interventions, then examine possible impacts of the free-care policy that was implemented part-way through our study. (2) and (3) we report lower and upper bounds on the estimated effects, using Manski's non-parametric method 27 Figure 3 suggests that the CCT could reduce quality if it increases demand sufficiently. We argue however that at the individual level, receipt of the CCT should not directly affect the quality of services offered to a particular woman, while possession of the voucher could induce the provider to supply higher quality care. 28 It is possible that the process that drove selection to deliver at a clinic was different before and after the June 1 st policy change. If so, we would need a second instrument to properly identify the impact of the vouchers on quality received, using data from both before and after the change. However, we observe little impact of the policy change on utilization rates, and suggest that it is difficult to see how the policy change would have altered the mix of women delivering in clinics, while leaving utilization rates themselves unaffected. In light of this, we assume the selection process before and after June 1 st was fixed. (Manski 1990) . Finally, in light of our concerns over mis-reporting, Columns (4) and (5) use data on our full sample of pregnant recruited women, as validated with data collected from the register books using the match algorithm discussed above, using either the partial or full match algorithms respectively. Our discussion will focus on Columns (1) and (5).
(i) Effects of experimental interventions on facility delivery rates
In both specifications, the first striking observation is that the constant terms, reflecting the rate of facility deliveries amongst women who received neither a maternity voucher nor a cash transfer, differ widely between Columns (1) and (5). When asked at endline, 79 percent of respondents in our control group reported delivering in a facility, while the validated data from the facilities' record books using the full match suggest only 33 percent of the pure control women were validated to have delivered in a clinic.
The partial match yields a rate in the control group of 46 percent. The fact that the facility delivery rate from the register data books are more in line with data from the DHS, provides further justification for our preference for the register book data over the data from the endline data, which we suspect suffered from over-reporting of facility deliveries. In addition, as previously discussed, we have no reason to believe that the register book data would be biased according to treatment status.
A first summary of treatment effects from the upper panel is that the full voucher and the conditional cash transfer each have large impacts on delivery rates, increasing them by 7.2-8.5 percentage points off a base of 33.0 percent. The copay voucher and the unconditional cash transfer have little effect on average, as do the SMS messages.
Turning to the saturated model in the lower panel, the impact of receiving just the full maternity voucher is 9.7-11.0 percentage points, using both endline and register book data. Similarly, the impact of receiving both the full maternity voucher and a conditional cash transfer is 12.0-14.0 points. However, when coupled with an unconditional cash transfer, the impact using endline data (11.0 points) disappears in the register book data.
Using the full match protocol, women who were assigned the copay voucher, which required them to pay a small fraction (10 percent) of the regular delivery price, exhibited virtually no change in facility deliveries, unless the voucher was coupled with a
CCT. This stands in contrast to the 11.0-point impact of the full voucher when received in isolation, significant at the 1-percent level. We report the p-value for F-test of the hypothesis of equal treatment effects of the full and copay voucher both when (CCT x Full = CCT x Copay) and (Full only = Copay only), however we are able to reject it when the effects of the cash transfers are excluded. On the other hand, we are able to reject the null of equal treatment effects of the CCT and UCT, both restricted to women who receive no voucher, and jointly across all voucher arms.
Coupling the copay voucher with the conditional cash transfer, however, increases the measured effect relative to the control group to 15.0 percentage points (8.4 points using endline data). As we observed with the full voucher, the impact of the copay voucher combined with the unconditional cash transfer is large when measured using the endline survey, but small and insignificant when using the record books.
The effect of receiving the conditional cash transfer alone is between 8.7 and 11.0 percentage points, while the impact of the unconditional transfer is statistically insignificant, using both data sources. In this case, as reported in the bottom panel, the effects of the conditional and unconditional cash transfers are statistically different from each other using the register book data, both across all groups (p < 0.01), and between the two cash transfer cells in which there was no maternity voucher (p < 0.05). Table 5 incorporates temporal effects to measure any changes to the data generating process that might have occurred after the introduction of the government's free care policy. Again, we present the unsaturated model in the top panel, and the saturated version in the lower panel. Using the full match validated register book data, Column (1) first includes a dummy variable equal to 1 for women whose expected delivery data was after June 1, 2013, but this is found to have no detectible impact on delivery rates.
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 5 estimate the basic models respectively before and after the policy change. Although the parameter values are similar in the two periods, we lack power in the pre-policy change regime to generate the same statistical significance 21 levels. The p-values associated with a Chow test in the unsaturated and saturated models are presented at the bottom of each panel, and suggest no change in the data generating process over time.
Our pattern of results is consistent with the following interpretations. First, we find evidence that both the full voucher and the conditional cash transfer were very effective at increasing demand for institutional deliveries in our sample of women. The full voucher alone increased the utilization of services by 11.0 percentage points while the conditional cash transfer increased it by 8.7 percentage points. When given together, women increased their propensity to delivery in a facility by 14.0 percentage points, or a roughly 42% increase compared to the control using the facility data, a very large proportional increase in delivery rates.
Second, we find that while both the co-pay voucher and the unconditional cash transfer had some impact according to the endline survey, neither demonstrated any significant effects using the register book data. Women who received a voucher and an unconditional cash transfer appear to have over-reported their rates of facility deliveries in the endline survey. On the other hand, recipients of the unconditional cash transfer who did not receive a maternity voucher seem to have felt no pressure to misreport.
What is more challenging to understand is why there is an impact on facility deliveries for women with a full maternity voucher only, while (according to the register book data) this effect is offset by receipt of an unconditional cash transfer. One possible explanation is that women with both a full voucher and the unconditional cash transfer misunderstood the combination, and interpreted the cash received as being the voucher itself, intended to finance maternity services, but realized they could spend it on something else. An alternative reason could be that women prefer to deliver at a private facility or with a traditional birth attendant, or at a facility outside Vihiga, and that receipt of the unconditional funds leads them to pay for such alternatives, even when care at the local facilities is free. 30 We further investigated this hypothesis by first observing that the number of deliveries at private facilities in Vihiga, or at any facility outside the 30 We test the hypothesis that women with unconditional cash transfers act on strong preferences to deliver in private/NGO facilities or outside the district. The p-value of our statistical test of no differences in this behavior between the conditional and unconditional arms is 0.56. Similarly, we find no evidence that these women were more likely to travel further for their deliveries, or use more expensive modes of transport.
county, was very low -only 1-2 percent as reported in the endline survey across all treatment arms. Notwithstanding the possible bias of the endline data, it seems unlikely that a large number of women use the unconditional cash transfer to purchase care from either of these alternative sources.
At recruitment, each woman was asked if she owned a mobile phone. She was also required to register a phone number that could be used to receive text messages and mobile money transfers as part of the treatments, or for SMS communications. There is a high correlation (0.6) between ownership at baseline and ownership of the registered number, but phone ownership at baseline provides a more meaningful basis upon which to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects, as phone registration could have responded to treatment assignment, and could be changed at any time during the intervention. Table 6 reports regressions to examine heterogeneity of the impact of the cash transfer and SMS arms by mobile phone ownership using the full match register book data as an outcome. Column (1) measures whether impacts of the cash transfer arms were moderated by phone ownership by including an interaction of phone ownership with assignment to the cash transfer arms. Phone ownership at baseline was directly associated with higher rates of facility deliveries (likely due to a wealth effect). Although statistically insignificant, the point estimate of the interacted term suggests a reduced effectiveness of the conditional cash transfer for women who own a phone at baseline. Column (2) reports results of the SMS interventions, again using the fully matched register book data. As earlier reported (Table 4) , neither the plain reminders nor the contextualized reminders had any measurable impact on facility deliveries. This stands in contrast to some other studies that have found meaningful effects of reminders on savings decisions (Karlan et al. 2016 ) as well as on adherence to anti-retroviral and malaria treatment (Lester et al. 2010; Pop-Eleches et al. 2011; Raifman et al. 2014) .
Column (2) tests whether the treatment effects are different for women who owned their own phone at baseline. Again, there appears to be little effect of the simple reminders, for both owners and non-owners -that is, the direct effect and the interaction with phone ownership are both small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. However, we find a sizeable (8.9 percentage point), although again imprecisely estimated, impact of the contextualized reminders on women who did not own a phone at baseline, while phone owners were not affected. One potential interpretation of these suggestive results is that the CCT or reminders can be effective if a third-party intermediary is engaged to deliver both the cash, as well as perhaps a face-to-face nudge, to the pregnant woman, although further research is needed to better understand these findings.
The motivation for the cash transfers was to overcome geographic barriers, by providing women with the means to pay for transport services. To gain more insight into this potential mechanism, we generate non-parametric estimates of facility delivery rates by distance from the nearest clinic. Figure 4 presents our results, comparing estimated delivery rates as a function of distance across the three cash transfer arms. 31 Over the whole range, women assigned to the conditional transfer arm have higher delivery rates than the other arms, consistent with the average treatment effects reported in Table 4 .
However, there is little meaningful treatment heterogeneity by distance to the nearest clinic. This is not inconsistent with the fact that the cash transfers were large enough to cover reasonable transport costs for all women in the sample, so the cost constraint was made non-binding for everyone, and not just those residing nearer to clinics.
31 Distance is measured between where the baseline interview took place (usually the woman's home) and the closest health facility. We present the results of a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of fraction delivered in a facility and distance from the nearest facility for each cash transfer arm. Distance is calculated as the crow flies between the GPS coordinates of the woman's home and the nearest health facility. We impute using the average of observed GPS coordinates in the village for those women with no home GPS measure. For a small fraction of women with missing GPS data, the average latitude and longitude for the village are used. We winsorize the distance data replacing the top and bottom 2 percent of the distance distribution.
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Figure 4: Facility delivery rates by cash transfer status and distance to health facility
(ii) Effects on demand for other services Table 7 reports treatment effects on other outcomes, including hospital (as opposed to clinic) deliveries, referrals, and the number of reported ANC and PNC visits.
Information on these outcomes is only available from the endline survey, so we report results using both the full endline sample, and a sub-sample restricted to those interviewed at endline whose answers to the delivery question were consistent with the record book data, according to the full match algorithm. Column (1) reports a regression in which the dependent variable is equal to one if her endline delivery response is inconsistent with the record book data. Assignment to the copay voucher plus CCT seems to be associated with more consistent responses, while those assigned to the UCT only cell were more inconsistent in their responses. There were, however, no systematic patterns across the other cells.
Columns (2) and (3) of Panel A report effects of assignment on hospital deliveries, for the full endline sample and amongst all those whose delivery answers were consistent with the record books. Similarly, columns (4) and (5) correspondingly report results for referrals. Having the full voucher and the CCT had a large effect on hospital delivery, raising it by 13-14 points off a base of about 20 percent (using both samples).
The copay voucher, when coupled with either cash transfer, does have an effect on hospital deliveries, but not in the absence of a cash transfer. Similarly, CCT or UCT by itself has no effect. The impacts on referrals follow those for hospital deliveries closely, suggesting the increase in hospital deliveries might be due to supply-side decisions rather than demand-side price effects. This in turn might mitigate concerns that a voucher program could lead to excessive demand at higher-level facilities, if referring health workers make decisions based primarily on perceived need.
In Panel B of the same table, we report results for regression of ANC and PNC visits on treatment assignment. In this table, we combine the full voucher and copay voucher arms, because under both non-delivery services were free (that is, there was no copayment for ANC or PNC services under the copay voucher arm). Across the board, we find no noticeable effect of any of the treatments on demand for ANC or PNC services -only one of the 27 coefficients reports is statistically significant, and then only at the 10 percent level. These results are likely due to the fact that ANC and PNC attendance rates are relatively high in our sample -the constants indicate that more than 70 percent of the control group made at least 4 ANC visits, while more than 80 percent made at least 3 PNC visits.
(iii) Effects of the free-care policy
Our results above (see Table 5 ) suggest that the government's policy of free care had little impact, if any, on the demand for maternal services in the time period we observe after the policy came into force, in contrast to the full voucher, which similarly reduced the consumer price to zero. Table 8 examines whether this possibility is borne out in the data,
reporting the results of a quality analysis using the cash transfers and SMS reminders as instruments in a Heckman selection model, to account for endogenous facility delivery and participation in the endline survey. 34 We do not report the first stage, but include the 33 Our data show that only 30 percent of study subjects believed that the policy would improve quality of health services 34 We collected information on the quality of care the women received during their pregnancy, including information on whether the woman was counseled on such topics as breast-feeding, umbilical cord care and other perinatal care, immunization, and hand-washing, all considered practices that are advantageous the child (Larson et al. 2014) . From these questions, using principal component analysis we construct an index of counseling coverage. Women were also asked whether they received potentially important health commodities during their delivery, including antibiotics (or another drug) by intravenous drip, a pill to stop the contraction of the uterus post birth (alluding to the use of misoprostol which is recommended postpartum for most women), manual removal of the placenta, or a blood transfusion. While higher levels of these services are generally understood to be a positive measure of quality, their appropriate use depends on the woman's needs. From these indicators we constructed a service availability index, also using principal component analysis. We also asked all women who reported having delivered in a health facility to rate the quality of care they received as excellent, very good, good, fair or poor. As measures of perceived quality, we believe the responses to this question are more subjective than the indicators described above. Some questions related to the quality of care delivered at an individual level: how would you rate your experience of being greeted and talked to respectfully?; how would you rate the privacy you were given (e.g. having a curtain)?; and inverse Mills ratio as an independent regressor. The quality measures include indices constructed for each of the following: (i) whether the woman received various counseling services during her delivery; (ii) the availability and use of various supplies and materials such as gloves, gauze, medications, etc.; (iii) a measure of overall respect shown by facility staff to clients; and (iv) a measure of overall satisfaction. The data used are reports by those women who delivered in a facility as determined from the register books.
The coefficient on the Mills ratio is only significant in the overall satisfaction regression, suggesting selection is not consistently biasing the quality results.
Based on this analysis, there is no evidence of any decline in perceived quality following the introduction of the free maternity care policy on June 1. Although the evidence is relatively weak, we do find some support for the possibility that before the policy change, provision of counseling services and respect were perceived to be higher for voucher recipients (Column (1)). Respect shown to clients appears to have increased after the June 1st policy change for voucher non-recipients (Column (3)), essentially converging to that of voucher holders. Other measures of quality did not change noticeably at that time. One interpretation of the data is that quality levels might have differed prior to the free-care policy, but this differential was eliminated afterwards. This result is puzzling, since before the policy change the clinics earned revenue from all women, including those with and without vouchers, but after the change voucher recipients likely had a higher marginal effect on clinic revenues. One possible reconciliation of our observations with the theory is that women without vouchers who received free care might have revised their quality expectations downward, and reported greater satisfaction than they otherwise would have. However, we lack data that could be used to meaningfully test this hypothesis.
Cost effectiveness
In this section we provide some simple illustrative back-of-the-envelope estimates of the cost-effectiveness of the voucher and cash transfer programs at increasing facility deliveries. Our main results suggest that the combination of full maternity voucher and how would you rate the clarity with which health providers explained things to you? From these questions we calculated an index of respect.
conditional cash transfer can increase the rates of facility deliveries by β = 11 percentage points from a control group base of about α = 33 percent. The cost of the full voucher was approximately v = $33 at the prevailing exchange rate, implying total gross voucher expenditure per additional facility delivery of (α + β)v / β = $132 .
Of course, private spending by the 33 percent of women in the control group who delivered in a facility was avoided by the comparable group in the treatment group. Preproject negotiations revealed private costs of about w = $23 per pregnancy. Netting out these savings, the cost per induced delivery falls to v +α(v − w) / β = $63 .
Finally, although the vouchers were financed out of donor-funded project resources, if the policy were to be financed from the Kenyan budget, the distortionary costs of raising the necessary funds would have to be considered. We conservatively assume a distortionary cost of public funds of λ = 0.5 , which is based on recent estimates of the marginal cost of public funds in African countries (Auriol and Warlters 2012) . In this case the net social cost per induced facility delivery, κ , accounting for both private cost savings and the marginal cost of raising pubic revenue, is:
Since we do not have information on the health and other benefits of delivering a child in a facility (although in principle the exogenous variation our experiment induced could help measure them) it is difficult to say whether the cost of inducing shifts to facility deliveries was worth it. This would necessarily be the subject of future research.
Conclusions
In this paper we report results of a randomized evaluation of two types of financial incentives delivered over the mobile network aimed at boosting the use of maternal health care services amongst poor rural women in western Kenya: vouchers and cash transfers. We also provide evidence of the effectiveness of a free care policy introduced by the government of Kenya during the course of our experiment. Finally, we tested the efficacy of text messages delivered over the mobile phone network in increasing demand for care in this population.
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Our main findings suggest that at least two of the interventions tested -full maternity vouchers and conditional cash transfers -were highly effective, and cost effective, at driving important improvements in facility delivery rates. The combination of the two incentives shows correspondingly larger, although sub-additive, impacts. On the other hand, unconditional cash transfers negligible effects on delivery outcomes, and vouchers with a small copayment had a very small positive but statistically insignificant effect. Among women who don't receive any cash transfers, we are able to draw a moderately strong conclusion about the discontinuity of the demand function at zero as our point estimate of the impact of the 10 percent copayment is statistically distinguishable from the (significant) estimate of the effect of the full voucher (p-value =.083) at the 10% level.
Our second main finding is that simply making maternity services nominally free through the free maternity care policy had little effect on demand over the time period we observe, perhaps because the consumer price was not driven all the way to zero, or because supply-side incentives were not maintained. Indeed, it is notable that the full voucher, which should not have directly affected demand after the government's free care policy went into effect, nonetheless continued to boost delivery services. In addition to removing cost of care to the consumer, and providing a price incentive for providers, the voucher may also have provided some additional reminder or incentive to women that encouraged facility births. Alternatively, women with vouchers could have been able to elicit higher levels of quality after the introduction of the policy.
Our work confirms the feasibility of delivering financial and informational incentives over the mobile network to poor women in remote areas. The conditional cash transfers, which potentially require little in the way of registration and documentation, could be especially easy to administer at scale. Moreover, our research has also provided some subtle insights into the potential mechanisms behind effective communication strategies. For example, our results suggest that women who had text messages sent to someone else's phone were more, not less, likely to respond to them. One interpretation of the observed heterogeneous treatment effect is that the text messages induced face-toface engagement by a third party (the owner of the phone), and that such personal interaction was instrumental in inducing behavior change. 35 The influence of the intermediary also appears to have modulated the impact of the unconditional cash transfer program. Future research could further investigate the impact of intermediaries in influencing the effectiveness of m-Health initiatives. Notes: Panel A summarizes the endline-eligible sample at baseline, which excludes women who died (n=2), miscarried (n=72), or turned out to not be pregnant (n=7) among the 1,595 women originally recruited. Treatment status did not predict any of these exclusions (not shown, but available upon request). Panel B summarizes the sample who were found, consented, and completed the endline among those eligible to complete the survey. Panel C reports on the experimental sample for our SMS interention and is orthologal to the other interventions. (4) shows the means for the full endline eligible sample. Columns (5)- (7) show pairwise comparisons of means between the various study arms. Column (8) reports the p-value for the test that all study arms have the same mean. All variables are measured at baseline and are binary unless otherwise stated. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. Notes: The dependent variables in each column correspond to three forms of attrition. Column (1) takes the value 1 if the woman cannot be found or does not consent to the endline survey and 0 otherwise. Column (2) takes the value 1 if woman cannot be found at endline and 0 otherwise. Column (3) takes the value of 1 if the woman is found but does not provide consent for the endline and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the village level. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. Notes: This table provides linear probability estimates of the impact of treatments on facility delivery, which is defined in different ways. In column (1), the dependent variable takes on the value of 1 if the woman reports delivering in a facility in endline survey or 0 otherwise. In Column (4) the dependent variable takes on the value of 1 if the woman's delivery is partially matched to the register books using methodology described in the text while column (5) uses the full match algorithm instead. Columns (2) and (3) represent delivery outcomes that account for attrition following Manski (1990) . The Lower Manski Bound assumes facility delivery for attrited controls and home delivery for attriting treated observations. The Upper Manski Bound assumes institutional deliveries for those who attrited from the treatment group. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the village level. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. Notes: This table presents two tests for changes in the delivery specification before and after June 1. The dependent variable takes on the value of 1 if the woman's delivery is a full match with the register books. Column (1) is the estimate for all endline eligible women, while column (2) estimates the model for women with expected delivery dates before June 1, 2013 and column (3) estimates it for women with expected due dates after that date. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the village level. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. Note: I restrict the samples using the fuzzy match as the truth and throwing out observations that report different delivery outcomes than the fuzzy match.
Notes: This table presents linear probability estimates of the impact of experimental treatments on other delivery outcomes. In Panel A Columns (1) and (2) start by indicating the impact of treatments on misreporting delivery based on the partial (1) and full (2) matches. Columns (4) and (6) exclude all observations that are not identified as having delivered in a facility using the partial match. In Panel B, we examine the impact of treatments on recommended utilization of ANC (at least four visits) and PNC (3 visits). Note that since there was no co-pay for these services, the voucher arms are collapsed into one treatment. Standard errors ) . Column (1) & (2) represent indices of counseling and services inputs. Column 3 is an index of how respectful facility staff were and column 4 is an indicator for overall satisfaction with the delivery. We use an indicator for assignment to the conditional cash transfer as our instrument for the first stage. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the village level. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.
